Is War Inevitable?

The Thucydides Trap Argument

Introduction

In Destined for War (2017), Graham Allison popularized the concept of the “Thucydides Trap” to describe a recurring pattern in global politics. When a rising power threatens to displace an established one, war is often the result. In supporting his main argument, Allison is drawing from 16 historical case studies from which 12 ended in war[1]. Thus, the author warns that the U.S.–China strategic competition could follow the same path as Athens and Sparta in ancient Greece, war. However, other academics who have studied Thucydides, like Athanasios Platias and Vassilios Trigkas, challenge Allison’s main argument that war is inevitable. This paper analyzes both positions, identifies their strengths and limitations, and argues that Platias and Trigkas offer the more robust and nuanced interpretation.

Graham Allison’s argument. The Trap is inevitable

Allison’s is basing his argument in a passage from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, which simply claims that it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable. He analyses this dynamic into a broader theory of international relations which suggests that when a rising power (like Athens or today’s China) threatens to upend the status quo, the dominant power (like Sparta or modern United States) responds with fear, leading to miscalculation, escalation, and ultimately, war. In this regard, Allison identified 16 historical cases of power transition, ranging from the rivalry between Imperial Germany and Britain to the Cold War. His findings: 12 out of the 16 major power transitions resulted in war over the past 500 years.

Strengths of Allison’s Argument

Analyzing Allison’s argument, we can locate the systemic logic of Great Power Politics behind it as it aligns with core principles of structural realism in international relations. His focus is on the power dynamics between the hegemon power of the international system and the challenger; he highlights the forces that can shape national decisions. This can help experts to analyze beyond leadership unpredictability to identify broader patterns in global affairs. Additionally, Allison provides a way of asserting the risks of conflict excluding the speculation of intentions and ideology.

Moreover, Allison uses the empirical frame of 16 cases drawn from history in order to offer a starting point for comparative analysis. Thus, he encourages policymakers to study the historical power transitions to anticipate possible outcomes in the current strategic competition. China’s rapid rise can be seen now through historical precedents, even though the data is not flawless, which can lead to a structured debate about the potential outcomes.

Also, Allison translates academic analysis into strategic foresights for policymakers even though his main argument is that war is inevitable despite the leaders’ decisions. In this regard, his argument functions as a warning signal to the world leaders and forces political elites in the U.S. and China to take under consideration the possibility of miscalculation which can lead to a catastrophe.

Deconstructing the Thucydides Trap

As it mentioned above, since the publication of Destined for War (2017), Graham Allison’s concept of the “Thucydides Trap” has become strategic gospel. Based on a single sentence from Thucydides, "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable", the theory warns that when a rising power threatens to displace an established one, war is “almost inevitable.” Backed by a Harvard Belfer Center study of 16 historical cases, Allison frames the U.S.–China rivalry as a structural crisis in motion.

But a sharp counterargument has emerged from Greek strategists Athanasios Platias and Vassilios Trigkas in their recent book “Αποδομώντας την Παγίδα του Θουκυδίδη” (Deconstructing the Thucydides Trap). Their critique is not merely historical but mainly strategic. They reject the fatalism at the heart of Allison’s thesis, arguing that the U.S.–China rivalry must be understood through a lens of strategic choice, not inevitability, where agency, diplomacy, and restraint can still avert collision.